

**CURRENT POLITICAL PHENOMENA (30481)**

# **Populism in the XXI century**

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# What's populism by the way?

- **Political strategy?**

- ✓ “Political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (Weyland 2001)
- ✓ “Top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge established political or economic elites on behalf of an ill-defined *pueblo*” (Levitsky and Roberts 2011)

- **Political ideology?**

- ✓ “Thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017)

- **Discursive style?**

- ✓ Attribute of the message not of the speaker: “rhetorical style used by political actors of diverse ideological persuasions”; “predicated on the fundamental conflict between the corrupt elite and the people” (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016)

# Implications


- Areas: US, Europe, Latin America, Asia
- Focus: leadership, mobilization, political speeches and platforms, democracy, party system
- Opposite concepts: **elitism + pluralism**
- Different concept: clientelism
- Ingredients [political ideology]: **people + elite + general will**
  - ✓ People as sovereign, common people, nation
  - ✓ Difficulty to sustain in power
  - ✓ Promotion of institutions that enable the construction of the presumed general will

# Is it good or bad?

- + Inescapable shadow of representative democracy
  - ✓ Improve responsiveness and accountability
- + Emancipatory force (Laclau 2005)
  - ✓ Mobilize excluded sectors of society
- Perversion of democracy with autocratic tendency
  - ✓ Negation of pluralism may lead to circumvent minority rights
  - ✓ As a result: State occupation, mass clientelism, corruption, and suppression of civil society
  - ✓ “These practices find an explicit moral justification in the populist political imagination and can be avowed openly” (Muller 2016)


# Electoral support for populist parties

Figure 1. Support for Populist Parties in National Elections in EU member states



Source: Hix and Benedetto (2017)


# Electoral support for populist parties / 2



Source: Inglehart and Norris (2016)

# Populist parties and political ideology


Figure 5: Left/right orientation



Source: Guiso et al. (2017)

# Populist votes and trust in EU institutions

Figure 4.3: Correlation between Voting for Populist Parties and Trust in the European Parliament




Source: Dustman et al. (2017)




# Trust in national institutions


Figure 4.4: Correlation between Voting for Populist Parties and Trust in the National Parliame



(Coef. = -0.100, Std. Err. = 0.004, t-stat. = -28.75, N = 121,735)




(Coef. = -0.038, Std. Err. = 0.002, t-stat. = -17.08, N = 121,735)



(Coef. = -0.062, Std. Err. = 0.003, t-stat. = -22.65, N = 121,735)


Source: Dustman et al. (2017)

# Immigration concerns in the EU



Source: Dustman  
et al. (2017)

# Immigration concerns (by country)



Source: Dustman et al. (2017)

# The determinants of populism

1. **Demand side** of public opinion
2. **Supply side** of party strategies
3. **Constitutional constraints** and rules of the game

We focus on the first dimension

➤ Two “main” theses:


1. **Economic insecurity**
2. **Cultural backlash**

# Is it the economy?





- Multivariate correlations between economic status and propensity to vote populist (Dustman et al. 2017)
- No change in ideological or cultural attitudes during Great Recession (Foster and Frieden 2017)
- Import shocks from China (Autor et al. 2017)
- Trade origins of nationalism (Colantone and Stanig 2017)
- Immigration and UKIP votes (Becker and Fetzer 2016)
- Globalization shocks (Rodrik 2017)
- Interaction between demand and supply of populism (Guiso et al. 2017)

# Populist votes and economic climate

Figure 1: Populism, Economics, Turnout and Trust



Source: Guiso et al. (2017)



Source: Guiso et al. (2017)

# Econometric evidence


	(1) Heckprobit		(2) Heckprobit		(3) Heckprobit		(4) Heckprobit	
	Populist	Vote	Populist	Vote	Populist	Vote	Populist	Vote
Risk aversion	0.00313 (0.0120)	0.0228*** (0.00550)	0.00480 (0.0121)	0.0227*** (0.00550)	0.00455 (0.0128)	0.0245*** (0.00560)	0.00659 (0.0126)	0.0240*** (0.00563)
ln(Age)	-0.0985 (0.0670)	0.835*** (0.0274)	-0.0907 (0.0706)	0.831*** (0.0279)	-0.0555 (0.0878)	0.850*** (0.0293)	-0.121 (0.0792)	0.859*** (0.0296)
ln(Education)	-0.264*** (0.0593)	0.473*** (0.0304)	-0.305*** (0.0602)	0.471*** (0.0301)	-0.247*** (0.0661)	0.462*** (0.0315)	-0.249*** (0.0616)	0.456*** (0.0310)
TV total	0.00884 (0.00842)	-0.0277*** (0.00476)	0.00979 (0.00837)	-0.0276*** (0.00478)	0.0118 (0.00891)	-0.0269*** (0.00489)	0.00590 (0.00915)	-0.0258*** (0.00487)
TV politics	-0.00236 (0.0151)	0.0608*** (0.00633)	-0.00486 (0.0155)	0.0606*** (0.00638)	-0.00633 (0.0159)	0.0533*** (0.00703)	-0.00263 (0.0160)	0.0514*** (0.00699)
Unemployment	-0.0416 (0.0468)	-0.186*** (0.0198)						
Income difficulties	0.0767** (0.0305)	-0.148*** (0.0108)						
Explosure globalization	0.127*** (0.0412)	-0.101*** (0.0158)						
Economic insecurity (PC)			0.316*** (0.115)	-0.696*** (0.0331)	0.257** (0.121)	-0.659*** (0.0353)	0.279** (0.121)	-0.650*** (0.0353)
Trust in pol. parties					-0.0259** (0.0114)	0.0541*** (0.00410)	-0.0229** (0.0102)	0.0525*** (0.00411)
Few immigrants from no-EU							0.116*** (0.0214)	-0.0292*** (0.00884)
Controls, Wave FE, Country FE	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Rho	-0.109		-0.161		-0.108		-0.210	
Cluster SE	Region		Region		Region		Region	
Countries	With P		With P		With P		With P	
Observations	136,634		136,634		126,569		124,458	
Censored observations	40,441		40,441		37,260		36,353	
<i>Selection</i>								
Rain		0.000315 (0.00186)		0.000341 (0.00185)		0.00295 (0.00223)		0.00153 (0.00188)
Rain * South		-0.0175** (0.00856)		-0.0174** (0.00864)		0.00439 (0.0134)		-0.0181** (0.00811)
Av. Temperature		-0.00490** (0.00216)		-0.00478** (0.00214)		-0.00442** (0.00222)		-0.00551** (0.00219)
Av. Temperature * South		0.0250 (0.0179)		0.0237 (0.0181)		0.0631** (0.0293)		0.0327* (0.0181)

Source: Guiso  
et al. (2017)



# Is it culture?

- Reaction against “silent revolution” of progressive cultural change (Inglehart and Norris 2016)
  - ✓ “Populism favors mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, national self-interest over international cooperation, closed borders over free flow of people, ideas, labor, and capital, traditionalism over progressive and liberal social values”
  - ✓ Post-materialist vs traditional values
  - ✓ Enemies: corrupt establishment, incompetent politicians, dishonest Wall Street speculators, arrogant intellectuals, politically correct liberals




Source: Inglehart and Norris (2016)

# Economic vs cultural cleavage

CHES Variable name	Description	Cultural cleavage	Economic cleavage
Galtan	Favor traditional values	.943	
Sociallifestyle	Opposes liberal social lifestyles	.923	
Nationalism	Promote nationalism	.918	
Civlib_laworder	Favors tough law and order	.916	
Multiculturalism	Against multiculturalism on immigrants	.904	
Immigrate_policy	Against immigration	.880	
Ethnic_minorities	Opposes rights for ethnic minorities	.864	
Religious_principle	Supports religious principles in politics	.787	
Urban_rural	Supports rural interests	.737	
Deregulation	Favors market deregulation		.956
Econ_interven	Opposed to state economic intervention		.925
Redistribution	Opposed to wealth redistribution		.894
Spendvtax	Favor cuts in taxes and services		.890


Source: Inglehart and Norris (2016)

# Classification of populist parties



Source: Inglehart and Norris (2016)

# Decline of class voting




Source: Inglehart and Norris (2016)

	A: Controls			B: Controls + Economic security			C: Controls + Cultural Values			D: Combined model			E: Interaction model		
	Beta	SE	Sig	Beta	SE	Sig	Beta	SE	Sig	Beta	SE	Sig	Beta	SE	Sig
<b>CONTROLS</b>															
Age (years)	.007	.001	***	.006	.001	***	.005	.001	***	.004	.001	***	.004	.001	***
Sex (male)	.380	.021	***	.341	.022	***	.319	.022	***	.286	.023	***	.289	.023	***
Education	-.086	.008	***	-.062	.009	***	-.026	.008	***	-.011	.009	N/s	-.007	.009	N/s
Religiosity	.123	.004	***	.122	.004	***	.084	.004	***	.087	.004	***	.087	.004	***
Ethnic minority	-.952	.043	***	-.915	.069	***	-.760	.069	***	-.720	.070	***	-.731	.070	***
<b>ECONOMIC INEQUALITY</b>															
Routine non-manual				.180	.027	***				.221	.028	***	.217	.028	***
Petite bourgeoisie				.372	.032	***				.261	.033	***	.257	.033	***
Skilled manual worker				.243	.038	***				.280	.039	***	.271	.039	***
Unskilled manual worker				.217	.035	***				.225	.036	***	.219	.036	***
Unemployed (3 months+)				.082	.025	***				.150	.025	***	.150	.025	***
Live on social benefits				-.409	.067	***				-.304	.068	***	-.289	.068	***
Subjective economic insecurity				.025	.013	*				-.081	.014	***	-.080	.088	N/s
Urbanization				-.068	.031	***				-.077	.009	***	-.078	.027	***
<b>CULTURAL VALUE SCALES</b>															
Anti-immigration							.016	.001	***	.016	.001	***	.024	.001	***
Mistrust global governance							.005	.001	***	.005	.001	***	.007	.001	***
Mistrust national governance							.003	.001	***	.003	.001	***	.008	.002	***
Authoritarian values							.008	.001	***	.008	.001	***	-.003	.002	N/s
Rightwing self-placement							.314	.005	***	.314	.005	***	.306	.013	***
<b>INTERACTION VAR</b>															
Anti-immigration * EconInsecure													-.004	.001	***
Mistrust global gov * EconInsecure													-.001	.001	N/s
Mistrust natgov * EconInsecure													-.003	.001	***
Authoritarian * EconInsecure													.005	.001	***
Rightwing * EconInsecure													.003	.006	N/s
Constant	-3.7			-4.1			-4.8			-7.1			-7.1		
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.032			.036			.128			.128			.130		
% correctly predicted	94.5			94.5			94.6			94.5			94.5		

Source: Inglehart and Norris (2016)

# Subjective social status

- The role of “subjective social status” (Gidron and Hall 2017)
- Spatial dimension/sorting
- Clear interaction with economic status, but distinct concept
- “Strangers in their own land” (Hochschild 2016)
- **And don't forget institutions!**
- Possible multiple equilibria based on institutional quality



**Leave voters****Remain voters**

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*Difference in positive and negative responses from each group (in % points)*

**Economic situation**

Life in Britain is better (+) or worse (-) than it was 30 years ago	- 16	46
For most children life will be better (+) or worse (-) than for their parents	- 22	4
There will be more future opportunities (+) or threats (-) to my standard of living	-42	-20


**Cultural issues**

*These are a force for good (% agree):*

Multiculturalism	26 %	70 %
Social Liberalism	28 %	65 %
Immigration	14 %	57 %
Globalization	31 %	54 %
Feminism	44 %	71 %
Green movement	42 %	73 %

Source: Gidron and Hall (2017)






Source: Gidron and Hall (2017)

# The populist curve (work in progress)

- Close-race RDD to estimate causal effect of “local” populist parties on their vote share in national elections
  - ✓ “Opposition” party by narrow margin → **increasing trend**
  - ✓ “Government” party by narrow margin → **decreasing trend**
- Populist parties in government like “*sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of hell whom he has called up by his spells*”?
- Why don't populist parties stop the decline?



# The (worst) response to populism

- Why don't traditional parties stop the populist surge?
  - ✓ Globalization and lost sovereignty
  - ✓ External and/or constitutional constraints
  - ✓ Responsiveness vs responsibility
  - ✓ Poor institutional quality and low-ability politicians
  - ✓ New cleavages make it harder to collude or to build winning coalition

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