Scientific publications

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy - 5 (2013), 222-250

Social Capital and Political Accountability

We investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic wellbeing and the functioning of institutions: political accountability.
Joint with Andrea Stella, Guido Tabellini, and Ugo Troiano

The Political Resource Curse

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data.
Joint with Fernanda Brollo, Roberto Perotti, and Guido Tabellini

Competing on Good Politicians

We introduce a theoretical model where ideological parties select and allocate high-valence (experts) and low-valence (party loyalists) candidates into electoral districts.
Joint with Vincenzo Galasso

Journal of Public Economics - 94 (2010), 688-699

Moonlighting Politicians

When the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life.
Joint with Stefano Gagliarducci and Paolo Naticchioni

CESifo Working Paper Series 2967

Autocratic Transitions and Growth

In this paper we use a transparent statistical methodology to implement data-driven comparative studies about the impact of autocratic transition on real per capita GDP.
Joint with Roberto Ricciuti