We investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic wellbeing and the functioning of institutions: political accountability.

The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data.

This article uses a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to disclose purely political reasons in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state.

We introduce a theoretical model where ideological parties select and allocate high-valence (experts) and low-valence (party loyalists) candidates into electoral districts.

We investigate the effect of trade openness on economic growth in transition countries using a transparent statistical methodology that leads to data-driven case studies.

When the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life.

In this paper we use a transparent statistical methodology to implement data-driven comparative studies about the impact of autocratic transition on real per capita GDP.

Studies of the impact of trade openness on growth are based either on cross-country analysis—which lacks transparency—or case studies—which lack statistical rigor.

The diffusion of Temporary Work Agency (TWA) jobs originated a harsh policy debate and ambiguous empirical evidence.